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Abstract 
 
Cryptocurrencies and blockchain networks have attracted tremendous attention from their 
volatile price movements and the promise of decentralization. However, most projects run on 
business narratives with no way to test and verify their assumptions and promises about the 
future. The complex nature of system dynamics within networked economies has rendered it 
difficult to reason about the growth and evolution of these networks. This paper drew concepts 
from differential games, classical control engineering, and stochastic dynamical system to come 
up with a framework and example to model, simulate, and engineer networked token economies. 
A model on a generalized token economy is proposed where miners provide service to a platform 
in exchange for a cryptocurrency and users consume service from the platform. Simulations of 
this model allow us to observe outcomes of complex dynamics and reason about the evolution of 
the system. Speculative price movements and engineered block rewards were then experimented 
to observe their impact on system dynamics and network-level goals. The model presented is 
necessarily limited so we conclude by exploring those limitations and outlining future research 
directions.  
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Introduction 
 
A Token Economy 
 
The advent of Bitcoin ushered in a wave of blockchain projects with native currencies, distributed 
architecture, and cryptographic guarantees. Many projects are built on the business narrative of a 
new digital economy where one can provide service or product and get paid in cryptocurrencies 
that can be sold on exchanges around the world. Given the decentralized nature of most of these 
platforms, there is almost no external authority that governs the evolution of these networks. 
These self-sovereign networks with emergent properties are only controlled by the rules of the 
system and the human agents that interact with them. It has become increasingly important to 
design the right set of microscopic incentives that can achieve the desirable system-level 
behavior. With economic incentives, human decisions, and cryptographic proofs, the term 
cryptoeconomics is coined to describe the design and study of incentives and mechanisms in a 
blockchain network. 
  
Many approach the design problem with theories from mechanism design and algorithmic game 
theory whose analyses focus on the equilibrium [1]. However, the real world is full of random 
disturbances, irrational behaviors, and deviation from the equilibrium which goes beyond the 
scope of those analyses. We draw inspiration from early military pursuer-and-evader differential 
games where the model is agnostic to the exact behavior of the players and derives proofs just 
from permissible actions and trajectories of the system [2]. In the context of designing a 
blockchain economic system, as protocol designers, we want to design a set of rules such that 
irrespective of exact agent behaviors, the system-level objectives are still preserved. Compared to 
other games and distributed control considered in the past [3, 4, 5], putting protocol design in the 
context of a game has the property of global information where every agent is aware of the 
actions and payoffs of other players. 
 
Our Markovian dynamical system modeling approach for decision making and economics drew 
inspiration from Ole Peters and Alexander Adamou’s work on ergodicity economics [6] and John 
Sterman’s work on business dynamics [7]. In addition, a stochastic dynamical system model 
enables us to understand complex relationships within a system and observe the business level 
impact resulted from secondary or tertiary dynamics. Non-obvious business impacts that are 
difficult to conceptualize will become clear and obvious after one has witnessed the impact as an 
outcome of a dynamical system. Such an impact is often non-intuitive prior to the observation. 
 
 
 Differential Games and Control 
 
Differential games bridge many concepts in control theory with game theory. Control theory is 
foundational to design systems that are robust to environmental noise and system-failures [8]. In 
our previous paper [9], we have described an application of state-space model to the analysis of 
blockchain networks. In this thesis, we will further describe the process of using state-space 
model to control and optimize for desired properties from the perspective of a protocol designer. 
To fully harness the power of control theory, we first need to define the system-level objectives 
for the blockchain network which are often neglected in the business narratives. In addition, 
traditional control theory often deals with physical system over which designers have direct 
control [10]. In designing an economic network of human agents and incentives, designers at best 
have indirect control over the incentive structure with little control over the exact behavior. 
 
Since a large part of the design depends on the system-level objective for control engineering 
principles to work, we should first define the system in its state variables, transition functions, 
system-level objectives and cost constraints. Common system-goals include steady appreciation 
of network token, low cost of service provided on the network, steady growth of network 
utilization and so on. We will then have the potential to apply Lyapunov-style arguments to 
bound the reachable states of the system through the bound on its inputs [11]. However, to do a 
full proof of min-max optimization with Lyapunov control over input and output requires much 
more rigorous analysis and much contextual knowledge. Protocol designers will also require the 
power to design a universe where they can design incentive structure and energy function such 
that it requires energy for users to go against the allowable option space. Traditional control 
engineering concept such as a barrier function can be applied in constraining the allowable 
actions and reachable space. While this is a very interesting area, this thesis will not focus on its 
proof and analysis but instead setting up a generalized token economy model that other more 
complex models and system can be extended from.  
 
Another major difference of our model from classical control system model is the presence of a 
black box. We see this in price movement but also in agent behavior. Each individual follows 
their own control policies, not necessarily the ones that protocol designers hope for. This is where 
concepts from differential games come in. Agents follow their own policies as a function of their 
own beliefs of the system state and their own payout function. The collective behaviors of 
different agents result in sometimes unexpected system-level outcome. A differential game 
assumes an adversarial agent with a complete opposite payout function. The role of the designer 
is to design a set of rules and incentives such that the system-level goal can still be achieved 
irrespective of the exact behavior of the agents. In our model, we will treat these black boxes as 
random variables drawn from a reasonable distribution from which some meaning can be derived. 
 
  
Figure 1. High-level control systems for agent-based networks. 
 
As illustrated in the figure above, the exact agent beliefs and the full state of the system are much 
like black boxes. Random processes will be fed into the agent policies and system mechanism 
which collectively update the unobservable full system state. Agents in the system can then 
observe the state and form their beliefs, signals, and objectives that impact their policies in the 
next iteration. Despite the presence of these unobservable states and random processes, we can 
design allowable agent policies and system mechanisms to achieve certain observable outcome. 
This mix of white-box and black-box approach renders the token design process robust and 
innovative. 
 
Networked Economy 
 
Another key aspect of a token economy is that it is a global networked economy from day one, 
from the physical layer of distributed machines that power the network to the agent level network 
of producers and consumers of services [9]. There are many interesting topics within the domain 
of network itself that are worth considering. Quite a few papers in network formation will prove 
relevant in modeling and understanding the growth of a network [12, 13]. In addition, the contact 
and interaction of agents on the network are also dependent on the network topology, similar to 
how epidemic spreads over different network topologies [14, 15]. Network topologies play an 
important role in network efficiency, growth, and even adoption. 
 
However, as our thesis focuses on the economics of the token economy on a population level, the 
exact interaction over network topology is important but less relevant in the immediate term. 
 
Many of the cryptoeconomic networks are still in their infancy for us to consider their topologies. 
In addition, much of the impact of network topology is reflected in network latency which at best 
can lead to lag in decision and processes. For example, mining nodes operating in a mining farm 
share close proximity with each other and result in reduced latency and oftentimes lead to gains in 
consensus power [16, 17]. In our population level analysis of a service based economy, the 
impact of network topology has been absorbed and reflected in the quality of service, in terms of 
up time, response time, and latency. From a population-level economy’s perspective, it may 
appear to be a random noise in the system and hence, we will not include network topology in our 
modeling and analysis. Nonetheless, our model lays down the foundation for future work and 
enhancement in this area. 
 
Beyond Cryptocurrencies 
 
Even though the problem that we are solving stems from designing cryptoeconomic network, 
there are many parallels and similarities between designing the rules to deploy resources in a 
blockchain network and allocating resources to build a network economy with venture capital. 
After all, the generous block rewards subsidizing a new token economy is very similar to the 
subsidies for new platform businesses provided by venture capital money, like Airbnb, Uber, and 
Lime. Perhaps they know how to allocate resources and design incentives to achieve system-level 
objectives for their networked economy. 
 
From an economic research perspective, our approach has well addressed the Lucas critique in 
macroeconomics. Lucas critique argues that it is naive to solely rely on past data and correlation 
and neglect fundamental micro-foundations in designing economic policies and making economic 
decisions [18]. It is worth noting that our approach to engineering economies address this critique 
head-on. We start from agent-level incentives and policies with the system state as an input. We 
will then run simulation with state updates to help further refine the agent policies and shed light 
on system level decisions. This combination of microeconomic incentives and macroeconomic 
outcome connected through networked system dynamics underpins the robustness of our model 
and approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Setup 
 
To facilitate proper design and engineering of a token economy, we need to first define its 
internal states and transition dynamics. First of all, let us first define a token economy and how it 
might be different from a traditional platform economy despite their similarities. Next, we will 
highlight the assumptions that we will be using in our model. Lastly, we will define the minimal 
set of internal states and their dynamics. 
 
Traditional networked economies have been characterized by a centralized platform where users 
and producers can exchange services on this platform. The value of such a platform is often 
considered to be proportional to the square of the number of active users by Metcalfe's Law [19]. 
While Bitcoin and other dominant blockchain platforms today have been criticized for their high 
energy usage and wasteful computation with its Proof of Work, there are new token economies 
introducing new models where the work done by miners can be useful and dubbed Proof of 
Useful Work. The work that miners have done is both useful to the users and useful in 
maintaining consensus and network security. New networked economies such as incentivized 
peer-to-peer file storage network and video streaming network are just two promising examples 
[20, 21]. 
  
For most of these token economies, platform providers and service producers are tightly coupled 
even though they have plans to allow for third-party providers on their network to provide 
differentiated services. Apart from that, there are protocol designers and organizations designing 
state update mechanisms and policies within the system but not actively participating in the 
economy. As such, in our models below, we will combine platform providers and service 
producers into miners and we will put ourselves in the shoes of protocol designers with design 
freedom over state update mechanisms. 
 
Model Assumptions 
 
To help formulate the model for a token economy, we will first define the assumptions that we 
are making. After all, the quality of a model is only as good as its assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1: 
 
 
The model considers each miner and user homogeneous with unit service capacity similar 
to work in mean field games [22]. A large miner in real life will just be an aggregation of many 
unit miners in the model. Similarly, a user with a lot of demand will be a combination of many 
unit users. Each unit miner and unit user supply and demand one unit of service which is defined 
by the users of the model. This abstracts away individual idiosyncratic demand and supply from 
users and miners. Each user demands one unit of service and each miner can only provide one.  
 
Assumption 2: 
 
We assume a perfectly competitive market where miners are users are both price takers, 
given the open nature of a token economy [23]. Users will consume inversely proportional the 
unit price of service denominated in fiat currency. Similarly for miners, if mining is very 
profitable, miners will provide as much service as possible to earn block rewards. Furthermore, 
we assume the service that miners provide is a commodity, meaning that it does not matter who 
produces the unit service. This is in alignment with the assumption of a perfectly competitive 
market where products are homogeneous with no differentiation [24]. 
 
Model Scope 
 
With these assumptions in mind, we can create a state-space representation of the system. We aim 
to define the minimal set of internal states that can capture different aspects of the system. The 
system can pause and restart any time if we keep track of all the state variables. We will also 
define TOKEN, or TOK in short, as the native cryptocurrency to the network. There are two 
subsystems within our token economy. The first is with regard to the flow of TOK and the second 
is related to the service provided on the network. The two subsystems are connected with three 
important signals, miner’s profitability, price of service on the platform, and the price of the token 
itself. We also assume a discrete time system and states are only updated after a new block is 
produced. Note that it can also be extended into an event-based discrete time system. 
 
If we first look at where TOKs are held, they can be in the hands of miners, users, and a liquid 
pool. We are calling them TOK miner, TOK user, and TOK liquid. In many cases, miners are 
required to pose a collateral requirement in TOK to participate in the network and block rewards 
are minted directly to miners’ account [25]. Miners allocate a portion of their TOK to participate 
in the mining process to earn more block rewards and may sell some of them to the liquid pool 
when the price is high. Similarly, users buy TOKs from the liquid pool to purchase service from 
miners or they can speculate and trade in the market. Here, we can encode different user and 
miner population profiles in which they have different strategies and thresholds with regard to 
trading TOK [26]. The flow of TOK among different holding parties within the system can be 
illustrated with Figure 2 below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow diagram of TOK holdings. 
 
The change in total TOK owned by miners is constantly affected by the inflow of block rewards 
and transaction fee paid by the users. Depending on the price of TOK at t, miner population will 
sell a fraction of its share of TOK to the liquid market. Similarly for users, rational users may 
hoard TOK when the price is low and attempt to sell them when the price is high. Users who are 
using the service on demand will purchase TOK when the service price is attractive and users will 
have to pay for a transaction fee when service is consumed. Miners and users buy from and sell to 
the liquid market which represents the total tradeable TOK available in the market. 
Fundamentally, network mints TOK in exchange for the service that miners provide, even though 
in an inflationary way.  
 
Given our efficient market assumption, we have decided to leave out the modeling of TOK 
holdings entirely. For one, it is one subsystem in and of itself with its own dynamics about price 
movement relative to the amount of TOK in the liquid pool and trading activities. In addition, 
with the efficient market assumption, we can assume that all the trading volume and liquidity has 
been embedded in the price. After all, both miners and users are just price takers. Lastly, within 
TOK user, there is also a group of speculative investors with a different set of dynamics. The 
dynamics of speculative investors catalyzing technological innovation is a very interesting topic 
but yet another subsystem that can be built as an extension to our model.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Feedback mechanism in a token economy. 
 
Figure 3 presents a more complete picture of feedback mechanism in a token economy. There are 
two main subsystems, one with the flow in TOK holdings and the other with the network service 
provided. The efficient market assumption allows us to treat price of TOK as a signal that 
encapsulates the flow in TOK holdings. Any attempts to take flows in TOK holdings into account 
at this point will over-complicate the model and introduce arbitrary dynamics. Nonetheless, it is 
worth considering and building a subsystem on top of that as an extension to our current model. 
 
Hence, the scope of our model is restricted to an efficient token economy where miners and users 
provide and consume commodity services on the platform as price takers. 
 
State Variables 
 
Given the above scope and assumptions, we will now define state variables for the token 
economy system that we would like to study. 
 
S(t):​ supply of unit service at time t 
D(t):​ demand of unit service at time t 
Q(t):​ transacted service at time t 
P(t):​ price of a unit service at time t 
R(t):​ miner profitability at time t 
 
TOK(t)​: price of a TOK at time t 
B(t):​ block rewards released at time t 
C(t):​ cost of unit service at time t 
 
There are also intermediary variables are relevant in state updates. 
 
ΔS(t):​ arrival of new unit service supply at time t 
ΔD(t): ​arrival of new unit service demand at time t 
V(t): ​TOK earned per unit fiat invested in the system at time t 
1/V(t): ​intrinsic value of TOK at time t 
U(t): ​speculative value of TOK at time t  
W(t):​ amount of TOK left in block rewards pool at time t 
M(t): ​total amount of tokens that has been released as block rewards by time t 
KPI(t): ​index on the network’s progress to achieve its goal at time t 
 
It is also worth noting that the price of TOK is not just dependent on the internal states of the 
system as TOK is openly traded on secondary markets from day one. Price of TOK will have 
significant impact on agent incentives within the network. It is also subject to influences from 
secondary market dynamics, speculation, and sentiments that may or may not correlate with the 
actual activity on the network itself. 
 
System Dynamics 
 
We will first model supply and demand as an arrival-departure stochastic dynamical system. 
Miner profitability and unit service price are the two driving signals for two main feedback loops 
in the systems. Miner profitability represents how much the network is going to pay for the 
service that miners provide. A high miner profit will bring in more miners and supply of service. 
Similarly, unit service price represents how much the network is willing to accept in exchange for 
the service capacity it provides. When mining is extremely profitable, we can expect service price 
to be small and supply outweighs demand. A low unit service price will bring in more users and 
more service demand. 
 
Hence, we are modeling the arrivals of new service supplied and new service demanded as two 
Poisson processes. 
 
ΔS(t) ~ Po(𝛌s(t)) 
ΔD(t) ~ Po(𝛌d(t)) 
 
 
The mean of two Poisson processes are dependent on the unit service price and miner 
profitability. More concretely, ​𝛌s(t)​ should expand when mining is very profitable and contract 
when it is less so. Similarly, ​𝛌d(t) ​will expand when the price of a unit service is low and contract 
when the price of a unit service is high. 
 
𝛌s(t) ~ 𝛌s(t-1) × (R(t) / R(t-1) ) 
𝛌d(t) ~  𝛌d(t-1) × (P(t-1) / P(t)) 
 
We further define two constants as the departure rates for service supplied and demanded. 
Xs:​ departure of unit service supply at every time step 
Xd:​ departure of unit service demand at every time step 
 
Having these two constants simplifies the dynamics without losing much of its meaning. In the 
case where supply is increasing quickly, we can consider service departure as departing and then 
immediately arriving again. This can be accounted for by a very positive ​ΔS(t)​. The same can be 
said about departure in demand. 
 
S(t) = S(t-1) + ΔS(t) - Xs 
D(t) = D(t-1) + ΔD(t) - Xd 
 
From ​S(t) ​and ​D(t)​, we can define ​P(t) ​and ​Q(t)​, which are the price of service and the amount of 
service consumed and transacted in every round. 
 
P(t) ~ D(t) / S(t) 
 
Given our efficient market assumption, price is simply set by relative strength in demand and 
supply. When demand is greater than supply, a higher price is expected and vice versa. This price 
model, despite being very simple, captures much of the dynamics in the system. It can be further 
expanded to include momentum, user valuation, and other factors that will affect service price. 
 
Q(t) ~ min(D(t), S(t)) 
 
Q(t)​ is the amount of service transacted on the network at time t. It is at most the minimum 
between net new demand and supply. After all, no transactions will take place with unmet 
demand or supply. This can be made more realistic with a slippage later since not all matching 
supply and demand can find each other in the market. Nonetheless, this has been taken care of by 
the efficient market assumption. 
 
We can now define the dynamics for the cost of providing a unit service, miner profitability, and 
price of TOK in our system. 
 
We will first model​ C(t) ​as a stochastic process that is noisy but it is neither diverging or 
converging, similar to sampling from a normal distribution with momentum. 
 
 
C(t) = 𝛼C(t-1) + (1-𝛼)N(𝝁, 𝝈) 
 
Then, we can define a signal​ V(t)​ which is the revenue per unit spend signal for miners from all 
the aforementioned state variables. 
 
V(t) ~ (P(t) × Q(t) + B(t)) / (C(t) × Q(t)) 
 
P(t) × Q(t)​ is how much miners earn from providing the service in terms of TOK and ​B(t)​ is the 
subsidy that the network provides in TOK at time t. This represents how much tokens are miner 
earning for the service they provide. Multiplying ​V(t)​ which is in TOK/FIAT by the price of 
token at time t, ​TOK(t)​, we get miner profitability in a unitless denomination. The system also 
cares about the inverse of ​V(t)​, which is ​1/V(t)​. This represents the intrinsic value of the token as 
it measures the value of service provided per unit of token in FIAT/TOK. 
 
R(t) = V(t) × TOK(t) 
 
However, determining ​TOK(t) ​is not easy. The secondary market price is a speculative estimator 
of future ​1/V(t)​. Market decouples from current state of ​1/V(t)​, because speculation is estimating 
future ​1/V(t)​ in an effort to create returns. Hence, it makes sense to model price of TOK as a 
convex combination of its intrinsic and speculative value. This is in line with the general asset 
pricing framework that the price of an asset can be attributed to its fundamental and speculative 
value [27, 28, 29]. Speculative value ​U(t)​ captures momentum in price movement with a naive 
projection. In the equation below, 𝛄 is treated as a constant but it can also be a randomized value 
that can randomize the composition of the mixture model. 
 
TOK(t) = 𝛄 × (1 / V(t)) + (1 - ​𝛄​) × U(t) 
 
Lastly, TOK issued in block rewards is usually set by a predetermined release schedule that 
follows an exponential decay rate. However, we can consider a more abstract and generalized 
version of block rewards issuance by introducing the concept of a ​KPI(t)​. Most traditional 
exponential decay block rewards scheme with a pre-determined release schedule is effectively 
treating the block time as the KPI. However, if we define the release of block reward as a 
function of the rate of change in achieving the KPI, we can then create direct incentives based on 
what the network desires. 
 
M(t) = B(i): ​total amount of tokens that has been released as block rewards by time t∑
t
i=0
 
W(t) = W(0) - B(i) = W(0) - M(t - 1): ​amount of TOK left in block rewards reserve∑
t−1
i=0
 
ΔKPI(t) = KPI(t) / KPI(t-1): ​change in KPI 
B(t) ~ 𝛆 × ΔKPI(t - 1) × W(t - 1) 
 
 
Subsidy can be given out as a function of the change in ​KPI(t)​ and the amount of TOK left in the 
rewards pool. This set of subsidies ​{B(0), B(1), B(2), ..., B(t)}​ can be the set of control policies 
that protocol designers can control to bootstrap the network to some target with some initial 
capital. This KPI can be as simple as the cumulative service transacted on the network over some 
period of time. Figure 4 below summarizes the system dynamics outlined above. 
 
 
Figure 4. System dynamics at every round of update. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Simulation and Evaluation 
We are leveraging a tool, cadCAD, which stands for Computer Aided Design of Complex 
Agent-based Decision System, developed by Dr Zargham and his team at BlockScience. It is a 
Python differential game engine that assists in the process of designing, testing, and validating 
complex systems through simulation. We have encoded the dynamics of different agents and 
subsystems in every discrete time step into the system. 
 
To facilitate evaluation, we want to outline a few metrics that we can use to define the success of 
our network. As a token-enabled platform economy, we would first want the platform to grow in 
adoption and in the underlying value of the token. In other words, we want ​Q(t)​, ​V(t)​, and 
TOK(t) ​to grow over time. We will also look at the distribution over the total aggregated growth 
of ​Q(t) ​in our model. In addition, we want a relatively low volatility in the price of the service 
provided ​P(t) × TOK(t) ​and hence we will look at the variance which is its mean squared error 
from its mean as a volatility metric. Too volatile a unit service price may render the platform 
service less attractive to potential users. 
 
We will first come up with a baseline simulation in which the release of block rewards follows a 
traditional exponential decay with a predetermined half-life on a similar normalized scale to 
Bitcoin. We will then run Monte Carlo simulations for the baseline setup and plot summary 
statistics of the metrics that we care about. Next, we will experiment with different block rewards 
subsidy regime to show that it can engineered to improve macroeconomic outcomes. 
 
Baseline Simulation 
 
As a baseline simulation, we are treating timestep as the KPI of the system. The concept of a KPI 
that the system is tracking can be applied to the timestep itself, demonstrating the generality of 
our model. The most common policy for block rewards is a halving schedule where the block 
rewards half after some period of time. Our baseline model will adopt a continuous exponential 
decay as the block reward release schedule, treating timestep as the KPI. To determine what is a 
good decay rate, we are looking at Bitcoin as the benchmark for our generalized token TOK. Note 
that almost every cryptocurrency follows a different schedule. Even in the case of Bitcoin, its 
block reward release function follows a step decay function with a halving period of 4 years, 
introducing arbitrary shocks into the system [30]. Hence, the goal for this comparison is to 
determine a comparable scale for the block reward schedule, rather than fitting for an estimate. 
Instead of simulating on the block by block level, we chose to simulate on a weekly basis. A 
 
week-by-week level makes it high-level enough to reason about the numbers and granular enough 
to experiment with policy changes. 
 
Currenc
y 
Total Supply Initial Block Reward (weekly) Half Life (weeks) 
BTC 21,000,000 50,400 208 (4 years) 
TOK 10,000,000 26,624 260 (5 years) 
 
Table 1. BTC and TOK release schedule comparison. 
 
The decay rate can be back-calculated with the following formula derived from the sum of a 
geometric series. 
 
otal Supply T = 1 − Decay Rate
 Initial Block Reward  
 
Initial Block Reward Initial Block Reward ecay Rate 2
1 =  × D Half  Life  
 
ecay Rate D Half  Life = 2
1  
 
Hence, the initial block reward is 26624.00 and the decay rate should be 0.99734. We will run 
Monte Carlo simulations for 100 times for each configuration for 1040 weeks or 20 years to 
evaluate the model. For the baseline simulation, here is the block rewards release chart. 
 
 
Figure 5. Baseline model open-loop deterministic block rewards B(t). 
 
 
Next, we would like to define the following metrics that we care about as a system. 
 
1. Growth trajectory in ​1/V(t)​ of unit FIAT/TOK.  
2. High aggregated growth in ​Q(t)​ which measures the usage of the system and 
approximates network value. 
3. Low variance on ​P(t) × TOK(t) ​as the price of the service in fiat unit. 
 
The following are the charts and statistics of a particular simulation of the baseline model over 
100 Monte Carlo runs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 6. (a) Summary statistics and (b) distribution of 1/V(t) 
over 100 Monte Carlo runs for baseline simulation. 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 7. (a) Summary statistics of TOK(t) and (b) bivariate distribution of log(TOK(t)) and 
1/V(t) 
 
over 100 Monte Carlo runs for baseline simulation. 
As we can see from Figure 6(a) and Figure 7(a), ​1/V(t)​ grows linearly and steadily whereas the 
token price on secondary market has increased exponentially. The mean token prices is at about a 
20-time multiple of the mean intrinsic value, suggesting that the token price is largely driven by 
speculative value. This is further confirmed by the joint distribution of ​log(TOK(t)) ​and ​1/V(t)​ in 
Figure 7(b). The log of ​TOK(t)​ is highly correlated with ​1/V(t)​, especially so when the network 
has gained some intrinsic value so that speculators have something to speculate on. 
 
However, the growth of the intrinsic value slows down rather quickly, as seen in Figure 6(a), 
while the token prices continue to grow in Figure 7(a). This can be attributed to how the 
secondary market prices are modeled in our system. It can also be explained by how secondary 
market is not trying to track intrinsic value but trying to track how much people consider the 
token to be worth in the future. This is rather common in the world of markets and finance where 
one hope to estimate the distribution and evolution of strategies by all players in the market. 
 
 
Figure 8. TOK movement for the first 5 Monte Carlo runs for baseline simulation. 
 
A sanity check from Figure 8 shows that our price simulation which is primarily a Brownian 
motion with drift is largely in line with movement in cryptocurrency prices, especially in Run 3. 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 9. (a) Aggregated growth in Q(t) (b) pairwise distribution of growth in Q(t) over different 
time durations over 100 Monte Carlo runs for baseline simulation. 
 
In Figure 9(a), we look at the aggregated growth in ​Q(t)​ which is the cumulative growth in 
transaction volume of the platform and we want to shift the overall distribution towards the right 
as much as possible. In Figure 9(b), we plot pairwise distribution of time averages of growth in 
Q(t)​. We observed that the average growth rate across 10 timesteps is still highly correlated with 
the average growth rate across 20 and 30 timesteps. This makes sense because, after all, they 
share the same underlying data and short-term price movements tend to have higher correlation 
with each other. However, this correlation falls apart as the duration window increases, indicating 
that the system is not time-invariant. This is interpreted as a result of non-ergodicity because if 
the system is indeed ergodic, we should expect invariance on the temporal dimension. Since it is 
not observed, we infer that there is some element of non-ergodicity. Note that there is a clear 
upward trend structure in Figure 9(b), this can be explained by how the simulation is set up and 
Q(t)​ always increases with new arrivals of ​S(t) ​and ​D(t)​. We can inject more entropy into the 
system by changing the initial values, arrival, and departure rates. 
 
This is an important result to acknowledge because most economic systems and human activities 
are non-ergodic in nature whereas many Markovian systems and simulations are implicitly 
ergodic. Non-ergodicity means that the ensemble average across different parallel universes is 
independent of the time average of a particular trajectory of an individual. This is important 
because even if we can derive properties successfully from an ensemble average, there are no 
guarantees that a particular network economy’s trajectory will be successful [31]. It will be 
interesting to further understand what contributes to the non-ergodicity in our system in future 
studies. 
 
 
Figure 10. Summary of P(t) over 100 Monte Carlo runs for baseline simulation in fiat currency. 
 
Figure 10 shows the movement of service price in fiat terms with a variance of ​10.43 and a mean 
of 3.55. A steady and relatively low service price is desirable property that the network would 
 
like to pursue. Nonetheless, what is a low price for unit service depends on what the unit service 
itself is and it is up to the users to define​. 
Speculative Price Influence 
The price of the token has been the bridge between the token economy and the rest of the world 
economy. It is therefore interesting to look at the impact of price movement on system-level 
objectives and behavior. In addition, cryptocurrencies have always been notorious for their price 
volatility and speculative behaviors. 
 
Speculative TOK prices play a dominant role in the​ R(t)​ which is the profitability level for 
miners. This will in turn have an impact on the supply of the service​ S(t)​ which will further 
impact service price ​P(t) ​and service transacted ​Q(t)​. As a result, the higher the TOK prices, the 
greater the miner profitability, the higher the service supply, and the lower the service price. A 
cheaper service price creates greater service demand ​D(t)​ that consumes the service supply​ S(t)​, 
leading to greater service transacted and hence even more profits for miners, creating a positive 
feedback loop as illustrated in Figure 11 below. 
 
 
Figure 11. Positive feedback loop within token economy. 
 
We now perform the following experiments with another 100 Monte Carlo simulations each at 
different upward drift in terms of TOK prices. In the baseline model, there is a 55% probability 
drift that TOK price will move up. We ran two separate experiments with 58% and 52% 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                                                                                              (b) 
 
Figure 12. (a) Summary charts of high speculative value scenario  
(b) summary charts of low speculative value scenario. 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 12(a), a greater upward drift results in much higher TOK prices and a 
rightward shift in the distribution of aggregated growth in ​Q(t)​ with a mean of 133x. However, it also 
results in a much higher unit service price in fiat denomination with a variance of ​283.96 and a mean of 
10.24. This is very much the case in Bitcoin when the transaction fee in fiat terms became too high as the price 
of Bitcoin went above $10,000. In contrast, in Figure 12(b) where there is not much speculation going on in 
TOK prices. We observe a leftward shift in the distribution of ​aggregated growth in ​Q(t)​ with a mean of 60x 
and much lower TOK prices. Nonetheless, the unit service price is much lower in fiat currency with a smaller 
variance of 0.176. Note also that the intrinsic value of the token is also much higher with higher speculation, as 
speculation leads to a larger network with a higher level of activity as described in the positive feedback loop 
above. 
 
As much as people criticized cryptocurrencies for their insane volatility, our simulation shows that consistent 
speculation can be a great way to seed a network. Fundamentally speaking, the existence of a token seeded the 
network with a community of stakeholders whose incentives are aligned to help the network grow and the 
token appreciate in value. Such an advantage is not present in most traditional ventures.  
 
We have attempted to pull real world data from decentralized networks. However, the data quality is rather 
poor with no simple ways to ingest and query. In addition, the notion of a unit service that the network 
provides is not well defined. For instance, Ethereum is providing distributed computation as a service but the 
unit of computation is not well defined on the network level. This is important for token economies to scale 
beyond the circle of hobbyists to allow for proper business forecasting, demand projection, and large-scale 
adoption. Nonetheless, the assumption of a user-defined unit service enables us to abstract away the exact 
value of supply and demand and instead focuses on the system dynamics. 
 
Engineering Block Rewards 
On a high level, we want a token economy where its native token continues to appreciate in intrinsic 
value, its service provided is highly demanded, and its service is transacted at a relatively stable price 
even in fiat denomination. The variable ​B(t)​, the block rewards at time t, plays a very important role. A 
high ​B(t) ​represents a high subsidy that the network provides to subsidize its formation. However, it is 
also an inflationary force that dilutes the intrinsic value of the token. Nonetheless, ​B(t)​ is a big part of 
miner profitability ​R(t)​ that will impact the service supply. Hence, we want to engineer ​B(t) ​such that it 
gives out more block reward when the intrinsic value is decreasing. We now attempt to engineer a series 
of block rewards that keep track of the system performance in ​1/V(t)​ with a series of ​B(t)​ that follows the 
following update equation,  
 
(t)  (t)B ~ V (t)V (t−1) ×  
B(t−1)
W (t−1) × W  
 
In other words, ​B(t)​ as a fraction of the remaining block rewards, ​W(t)​, increases when the intrinsic value 
1/V(t)​ decreases and hence maintaining a driving force on ​1/V(t)​. Given our new block rewards function, 
 
we will now perform 100 Monte Carlo runs with the same initial block rewards and speculative level as 
the baseline model. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Block rewards over 100 Monte Carlo runs for V_inverse targeted model . 
 
 
Figure 14. Summary of 1/V(t) over 100 Monte Carlo runs for V_inverse targeted simulation. 
 
Note that in Figure 13, there is a sharp drop to zero for block rewards. That occurs when the allocated 
block rewards reserve ​W(t)​ gets depleted. In Figure 14, the terminal intrinsic value did not significantly 
outperform that in our baseline model. This can be attributed to two factors. One, the block rewards might 
have been depleted in later stages and its impact on value has reduced. Two, as ​Q(t)​ grows, the intrinsic 
 
value is largely dominated by ​C(t)/P(t)​. However, it is worth noting that ​1/V(t)​ rose very sharply early in 
the network. The following table shows the time taken for the token value to reach certain milestones. 
 
 
V_inverse Value 0.5 0.75 1.00 
Baseline Model 28 weeks 177 ​weeks 529 weeks 
V_inverse targeted Model 9 weeks 125 ​weeks 504 weeks 
 
Table 2. Time taken for network to reach V_inverse milestones. 
 
After 100 Monte Carlo runs on each of our models, it takes about one third of the time for the intrinsic 
value to hit 0.5 and one year in advance for the metric to hit 0.75. As the network progresses, block 
rewards get depleted and ​Q(t)​ becomes the dominant factor and hence the advantage of a targeted model 
becomes less obvious. A more accurate model of intrinsic value will have to capture the network effect 
value of the system but that is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
We then attempted to run experiments that target the growth of ​R(t) ​in a similar way but given the 
volatility of ​TOK(t)​ as an input to ​R(t)​, block rewards get depleted quickly and fail to lead to interesting 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future Directions  
A reasonable, robust, and informative model of the token economy can serve as the springboard to answer 
more important questions that are of interest to users, miners, investors, and protocol designers. The 
mathematical constructs developed and examined in this paper pave the way for more complex system 
and network analyses. In classical control engineering language, we are designing a useful model of a 
plant in this paper, that is a representation of a token economy in which the network pays miners in tokens 
to provide for a service of interest to consumers. We will now discuss future directions that our thesis can 
lead to and outline their respective challenges. 
 
Network Effect as a Positive Externality 
Network effect can be loosely defined as the positive externality of a user to a platform economy when 
the user joins the network. Given the presence of network effect, the value of a product or platform 
increases with every additional user. Metcalfe's Law states that the value of a telecommunication network 
is proportional to the square of the number of users in the network. With our current set up, we consider 
the intrinsic value of the token as how much fiat money people are willing to put in exchange for the 
token. However, we do not capture the network effect that these token economy may achieve when it 
reaches a certain scale. After all, the holy grail of the most wildly successful ventures and platform 
economies is no doubt network effect. We would even argue that the ultimate goal of block reward 
subsidies is to bootstrap the network to a state in which strong network effect has been achieved. 
 
Network effects in the context of traditional venture backed startups are straightforward to understand. It 
is also quite similar in token economies and cryptocurrencies. Every additional person believing in the 
value of Bitcoin will make Bitcoin more valuable because other users can now exchange goods and 
services with this person in Bitcoin. Similarly for Ethereum as another case in point, every additional user 
of decentralized applications will make Ethereum as the underlying computation platform and token more 
valuable. 
 
The general heuristic for network effect is that users create more users, consumptions create 
consumptions, and capacity creates more capacity. We can potentially define an awareness vector that 
captures the awareness, sentiment, and perception of the network as a hidden state of the system. Changes 
in token price, user activity, media announcements, and so on will create a percentage change to this 
vector and the awareness vector will result in a faster adoption of the network. However, the modeling of 
network effect is another model in and of itself and hence we are not covering it in this thesis. 
 
 Lyapunov Argument with Energy Field 
Lyapunov argument is often used to provide guarantee on system stability around a subspace of attraction 
[32, 33]. If there is a maximum (or minimum) in an energy field and system energy is guaranteed to go up 
(or down) by at least a constant at every timestep, the system is bound to converge to the maximum (or 
the minimum). We have attempted to apply some of this concept into our system modeling. However, this 
will involve coming up with new energy field that may lose generality and breadth of application for our 
model since Lyapunov argument often only applies on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The general stability guarantee provided by Lyapunov arguments means that in a closed-loop system, the 
system converges to a low energy state. An additional layer to that is input-output stability which is more 
robust in the sense that a system is only stable to the extent that a threshold amount of energy is injected 
into the system. Otherwise, the system remains stable and converges to a ball in space. The only way to 
move up to a higher energy level is through agents injecting energy into the system. How much energy 
injection is required to move the system into a certain energy state depends on the energy function of the 
system, which can be made to be a Lyapunov one. For someone to attack a cryptoeconomic system, 
Lyapunov stability enables us to encode the energy of the system and compute how much resources in fiat 
currency unit are required to move the system out of its stability. For instance, we can compute the 
amount of capital expenditure required to increase the energy of the system by 1% and the system can be 
designed to be insensitive to massive energy injection from agents. Such an argument is more robust than 
the economic stability arguments that are currently made in the decentralized economy ecosystem which 
often only focus on the cost to attack a system at some point in time without taking the temporal dynamics 
of the system into account. 
 
 
Optimal Agent Strategy 
Another interesting angle to further this research is through the lens of an agent. Given the states and 
dynamics of the system, we hope to understand and compute the optimal strategies for a population of 
agents. We can define the following objective function for each agent i. Note that each agent i can also 
represent a subpopulation of agents with a similar profile. 
 
ax J (σ , X) (S , D , X)m i = U i i  − L i  i   
 
where is a concave personal utility function of agent i with , agent’s private beliefs, and X, theU i σi  
global observable system states, as inputs. Given the actions taken by the agent, , supply side actions,Si  
and , demand side actions, and the global state X, a cost is incurred as determined by the cost functionDi  
L. This formulation is heavily inspired by literature in optimal control theory with infinite time horizon 
 
[34]. As a control problem on infinite time horizon, discount on future utility has been accounted for by 
the utility function. Note that if one can properly define a terminating condition, such as achieving some 
definition of network effect, the above objective can be transformed to one that heavily rewards terminal 
utility and penalizes for the path taken to get there. It then becomes very similar to the strategy and 
optimization suggested in differential game literature [2]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis presents a methodology to model and simulate a generalized token economy in which the 
platform pays miners for a unit service provided in cryptocurrency. The market is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive with miners and users transacting a unit commodity service. To simulate the evolution of the 
system, we have defined a stochastic dynamical system and run Monte Carlo simulations to observe for 
system level behaviors and properties. Modifications to the model has been made to understand 
speculative price influence and explore the possibility of engineering block rewards for a specific 
property. Contrary to popular belief, token speculation on secondary market turns out to be beneficial to 
the network growth as it kicks start a positive feedback loop in adoption. Engineering block rewards to 
track token value also turns out to be viable but its impact will be better understood if we can include 
network value in modeling the value of the token. This thesis has been the first attempt to turn high level 
business narratives in cryptocurrency into observable and controllable simulation and experiment. We 
presented a framework and study on a generalized token economy that can be applied and extended easily 
to other more complex systems, turning the design of token economies from an art to a science. 
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